maandag 27 juli 2015

The business case for Identity providers (part 2)

In my previous post I wrote about about the costs of identity provisioning. Yes, a digital identity doesn't come for free, although you may experience otherwise. Lots of digital identities you get are free. For you, as a consumer or citizen. But the costs connected with your identity can be quite high. As I showed in my previous posts, costs of compliance and governance are high. And depending on the trust model that comes with the identity, the value of an identity can be high too. An identity is valuable if you can use it often en reuse it as well. The better the reuse potential, the higher the value of the digital identity that you may experience. And the higher the value that you experience, the more you will be inclined to use it.
But not every identity is equally valuable for us as citizens or consumers. In my opinion there are two major factors that impact the value: Trustworthiness and Reusability. Let me expand on this:

Trustworthiness is an interesting concept. In my country, The Netherlands, a few digital identities are trusted by almost everyone. A good example is a banking account. I can use my banking account at almost every webshop to perform transactions, limited only by the balance of my bank account. The banks in our country created a strong trust framework. They have to, of course, as they have to comply with lots of (international) rules and regulations. They made agreements with several trust brokers, so that even small shops could be part of the trust framework. Yet, the reuse potential of my bank ID is very low. I cannot use by bank ID to login to other sites, or webshops, or to login to a governmental site. Banks don't want you to reuse the identity. In fact, it is just an authorization ID, it only let's you perform a financial transaction... Don; t ask me why...
Interestingly: the bank ID may look free, but we have to pay a subscription fee every year in order to be able to use it.

The Dutch digital government identity is less trustworthy. Mostly because the provisioning takes place without a visual verification of the identity of the citizen. But although the trust level is quite low, the reuse potential is better than the bank ID, because the government want the citizens to use the citizen ID to perform transactions with all kinds of governmental sites and even some external parties can be accessed with 'DigID'.
The best part of this ID is that it's free... Until you remember that it is free because you, as a citizen, perform several tasks that, until a few years ago, were performed by civil servants. The cost savings for the govenrment must be enormous. That more than pays for the costs of ID compliance and ID governance.

There are other free digital identities. Just look at this account, a Google account, or Facebook or Twitter. These accounts can be reused. But reuse is limited to parties within the Trust framework of the identity providers. I can use my Gmail account to create posts on Blogger, but not to post a Twitter status update. Although Oauth kind of obfuscates the reuse bouderies, thank you OAuth ;)

Strangely I cannot recall a paid trustworthy digital identity that can be reused. Could that be a feasible option? I feel that there could well be a paid model. Of course there should be a trust model and of course that will be expensive. But perhaps there could be a business case for such a proposition.

To sum it up:
  • We do have free digital ID's that we can reuse, but with little trust
  • We do have paid trustworthy digital ID's that we cannot reuse

So, there may be room for
  • Free trustworthy ID's that we can reuse
  • Paid ID's that we can reuse

But... do we need all that?
I will try to answer this question in my next post.
(this post is a translated version of my earlier Dutch language post)

maandag 6 juli 2015

The business case for Identity providers (part 1)


In the Netherlands the government provides a reusable digital identity, DigiD, to it's citizens. DigiD can be used for different G-C transactions, for tax-return forms, getting certain licenses from local government, communicating with healt insurance companies and pension funds. The uses are strictly defined by law, you can't use DigiD for commercial transaction, like webshops or for other transaction. And DigiD can only be used in the Netherlands, not abroad. There is another 'minor' problem with DigiD: any Dutch citizen can request a DigiD and the DigiD Identity Provider (IdP) sends an activation code by snail-mail. Not the most secure way of identity provisioning and there have been some incidents of criminals fishing the activation letters from the mailbox. And if a criminal first requested a DigiD on behalf of a victim, of course he knows when to lookout for the mail to capture it…

Anyway the Dutch government is in the process of building a new identity framework, thereby making it possible for third parties to act as an identity provider within the Dutch eID framework.
In a series of blogposts (Dutch: First post and second one) I asked myself the question: is there a business case to become an IdP? Is there any commercial driver to become an IdP? Or are there other drivers?

I found out that it is very hard to answer these questions positively…

A few years ago I was at the European Identity conference in Munich and on one of the panels Kim Cameron remarked that everyone wants to be an IdP. If consumers use your Identity, the single fact that people use one your Identities creates a brand value. You grow a valuable reputation.

But if everyone becomes an IdP, what does that mean? Can you use and reuse every one of those identities? That makes for an interesting problem: at this moment noone wants to accept just any third party digital identities. The reuse capability is very small, too small to make people use a third party identity. We have a deadlock situation. Why is that?

Of course some identities can be reused. Think about Facebook, Twitter and LinkedIn identities. These can be reused, but just to a certain extent. These (free) identites are only trusted by service providers if there's something in for them... For a service provider these identities make it possible to have an authenticated account, without the need to store and protect identity information, like passwords. You can't lose what you don't have. So accepting third party identities is not only useful for consumers, but even more for SP's, as some kind of preventive privacy control against data leakage. But no service provider will let you make financial transactions using a facebook account. Facebook (as a service provider) may do so, but independent third parties will be very reluctant.

Why is the reuse capability of third party identities limited?
Well, in my opinion it's the lack of a transparant, and trusted, Trust Framework.

A few years ago we tried to create a Trust Framework based on the OpenID standard, we called it OpenID+. The + being the Trust Framework. The group that worked to create OpenID+ consisted of a government body, a few financial corporations, some ebusiness companies, media corporations, all prominently present on the Dutch internet space. Interestingly both IdP's and SP's took part in the development of the trust framework. The main principle being that any OpenID+ SP would have to accept any identty that was provided by any OpenID+ IdP!

We started building the policies and procedures, in our spare time (I know, I was one of the authors) and when we deemed the framework sufficiently mauture, we decided to go ahead and to start a few OpenID+ proofs of concept. In order to build the trust framework, we defined the technical extentions for OpenID, the policies for the identity provisioning processes, for deprovisioning, for auditing and legal issues. These were some of the questions that had to be answered in order to create the trust framework:
  • Should we create a (secure and trusted) white list of trustworthy OpenID+ IdP's?
  • How should an OpenID provider apply for the white list?
  • Should there be an audit guideline for audit or self-assessment?
  • Can any service provider access the white list, or should we allow only connected OpenID+ service providers?
  • How could we guarantee that all providers would interprete claims and attributes in the correct manner?
  • What should happen if an incident occurs? For instance in case of misuse or theft of an OpenID+ identity, or wrong interpretation of an attribute of an OpenID+ identity by a service provider?
  • How about liability in case of an incident?
  • How long should a white list entry be valid?
  • Would we need an arbitration committee?
Quite a lot of question, and this was only a small number of questions. And that was when trouble started. Defining the standards was okay, but implementing the standards proved very difficult. We found out that building such a trust framework was very expensive. Especially the documenting and auditing of the processes and techniques proved so costly, that the parties became afraid for what would come next. Who should pay the costs of such a trust framework?

As a result the OpenID+ framework was never implemented. There was no positive business case for any of the participants.

That's not the end of it. Yet. There are several financial models for IdP's. In my next post I will introduce different models and expend on the business case for Identity Providers. And I will try to explain why the reuse capability of digital identities is critical for the succes of IdP's.